Constitutional rights

September 5, 2011

DUI Update Sept. 2011 – What have they done to us this year?!

In the past year there have been a number of developments in the area of DUI law in Maryland, and most of them favor the State.

The Court of Appeals has issued a number of decisions favoring the MVA. In Hill v. Motor Vehicle Admin., the Court of Appeals rejected an argument that the DR-15 was misleading to drivers holding a commercial drivers license (CDL) because the form was claimed to not advise CDL holders that if they refused a breath test the interlock option would not available in lieu of the disqualification of the CDL. In Najafi v. Motor Vehicle Admin., although the Court of Appeals held that Najafi’s right to counsel was not violated, it said in dicta that a claim of a violation of the right to call a lawyer before deciding whether to submit to a breath or blood alcohol test cannot be litigated at an MVA hearing. In Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Loane, the Court of Appeals construed the plain language of Transportation Article, § 16-205.1(a)(2), that the implied consent law does not apply on purely private property. The Court held that despite this plain language that the implied consent law does apply on purely private property and that the issue cannot be raised in defense at an MVA implied consent hearing. In Thomas v. Motor Vehicle Admin., the Court of Appeals held that the “detention” referred to in § 16-205.1 is not required to be an arrest. In Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Aiken, the court held that the MVA need not produce the test strip or form Notification of Test Result, if the breath operator noted the test results under oath on the DR-15A Form. The court held that the MVA did not need to show in its prima facie case that the test had been administered with equipment approved by the toxicologist, because approval by the toxicologist was not listed as an issue that could be considered at the hearing under § 16-205.1(f)(7) of the Transportation Article. In Headen v. Motor Vehicle Admin., the Court of Appeals held that under § 12-111(b)(2) of the Transportation Article the MVA could designate drunk driving offenses as confidential after five years and deny expungement as to those convictions. The Court also held that a driver who is refused a drivers license due to an out-of-state suspension or revocation is not entitled to an administrative hearing to contest the refusal.

In Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shea, the Court of Appeals reviewed the question of what constitutes reasonable grounds to support the detention at an MVA hearing. The facts included the officer’s statement concerning a moderate odor of an alcohol beverage on the driver’s breath and that the driver submitted to standardized field sobriety tests. An administrative law judge took action against Shea’s license. On appeal, in response to Shea’s argument that the DR-15 Form provided insufficient reasonable grounds, the circuit court ruled for Shea but held that moderate odor of an alcohol beverage combined with a seatbelt violation was an insufficient basis to conduct field sobriety tests. The circuit court ruled for Shea but held that moderate odor of an alcohol beverage combined with a seatbelt violation was an insufficient basis to conduct field sobriety tests. The Court of Appeals reversed, relying on Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Richards, since the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply in MVA hearings. The Court also avoided deciding whether a moderate odor of an alcohol beverage alone could constitute reasonable grounds to support a detention to take a test, since the Court found that there was substantial evidence to support the finding of reasonable grounds, namely that the ALJ could have inferred on this record that Shea failed the standardized field sobriety tests.
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August 12, 2011

To Blow or Not to Blow? – That is the Question!

by Goldstein & Stamm, P.A.

Once a driver has been arrested for a DUI or DWI in Maryland by state, not federal, police, the arresting officer is required to read a form to the driver, called the DR-15 Form. This form explains the penalties for failing or refusing a breath or blood test. Of course if the driver passes the test, i.e. produces a result below .08, there is no penalty. Unfortunately, very few people have even the foggiest clue of what they will blow.

The penalty for failing the test is a 45 day suspension on a first offense or a 90 day suspension on a second or subsequent offense if the driver blows .08 or higher but less than .15. If it is a first offense within five years the driver may be eligible for work, school, medical, or alcohol education restricted driving privileges. If it is a second offense within five years the driver may only obtain a restriction allowing the driver to drive only vehicles equipped with an ignition interlock system.

If the driver blows .15 or higher the penalty is a 90 day suspension on a first offense or a 180 day suspension on a second or subsequent offense. In lieu of the suspension, the driver may be allowed to drive with an ignition interlock restriction for one year.

If the driver refuses the the penalties are a 120 day suspension for a first offense and a one year suspension for a second or subsequent offense. Again, the driver may be allowed to drive with an ignition interlock restriction for one year. A refusal may also be considered as evidence of guilt in court and may also subject the offender to an additional 60 days in jail.

July 1, 2011

Williams v. Illinois – Bullcoming on the defensive

by Goldstein & Stamm, P.A.

Last week I wrote about the decision of the Supreme Court in Bullcoming v. New Mexico. Everyone who participated (I helped to author the amicus brief filed by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers – NACDL) was thrilled. The Supreme Court held that a surrogate chemist could not testify to a blood alcohol reading when he did not supervise or observe the chemist performing the analysis without violating the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. This outcome was in doubt due to the replacement of two of the five justices in the majority in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, Justices Stevens and Souter. They were replaced by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan. Melendez-Diaz held that the chemist had to actually come to court and that a report would not suffice for confrontation purposes.

Melendez-Diaz was a 5-4 decision. The opinion, written by Justice Scalia, was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. The dissenters were Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Roberts and Alito. After Melendez-Diaz was decided, on June 25, 2009, the dissenters did not waste any time trying to get it overruled, perhaps to see if they could garner the vote of the justice who would replace Justice Souter, Justice Sotomayor. On the same day as the decision in Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Briscoe v. Virginia. Unfortunately for the dissenters, Briscoe, which challenged Virginia’s permutation of a notice and demand statute, and required the defense to call the opposing witness in its case, turned out to be a dud. On January 25, 2010, the Supreme Court followed Melendez-Diaz and issue a per curiam reversal in Briscoe. Justice Sotomayor had clearly sided with the Melendez-Diaz majority.

June 24, 2011

Victory in Bullcoming v. New Mexico!

by Goldstein & Stamm, P.A.

Yesterday, the United States Supreme Court announced its decision in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, reversing the New Mexico Supreme Court’s decision allowing the state to introduce a blood alcohol result through the testimony of a chemist who did not conduct the test. The case was argued and won by Jeffrey Fisher of Stanford Law School. I was privileged to have participated, along with Justin McShane, Ron Moore, Barbara Bergman, Molly Schmidt-Nowara and Alexandra Smith in writing an amicus brief on the winning side for the National College for DUI Defense, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the New Mexico Criminal Defense Lawyers Association. Our brief can be characterized as a kind of “Gas Chromatography for Dummies,” so that non-scientists could understand the complexity of the process, and why it is necessary to be able to question the actual chemist in order to be able to discover potential mistakes in the process or false statements. Footnote 1 of the court’s opinion shows that the five member majority got the message.

Bullcoming should not have any effect on state court proceedings in Maryland. Maryland has what is called a “notice and demand” statute that allows the prosecution to file a notice of a chemist’s report and phlebotomist’s testimony and requires the defense to file a demand for the presence of the chemist or analyst and of the qualified medical person who withdrew the blood. In state court, most lawyers routinely file such demands in blood test cases and unless the chemist comes to court the State cannot use the test result. By requiring the actual chemist and phlebotomist to come to court for the State to use a blood test result, Bullcoming changes nothing in Maryland state court because in almost all cases the actual chemist and phlebotomist is already required to come to court. However, in federal court, there is no comparable notice and demand statute and the government usually tries to introduce the blood test through a lab supervisor.
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